Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 3

1928

Wrongful Delivery of Deed in Escrow
W. Lewis Roberts
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Roberts, W. Lewis (1928) "Wrongful Delivery of Deed in Escrow," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 17: Iss. 1,
Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol17/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

WRONGFUL DELIVERY OF DEED IN ESCROW
Tke Kentucky Court of Appeals in Vaughan v. Vaughan'
has defined an "escrow" as "a writing delivered to a third party
to hold until the happening of some event, as until it is signed
by another party, consideration paid, or a suit be dismissed, and
until the event happens or the condition be performed, it can
have no effect." As the court pointed out, the term originally
applied to instruments for the conveyance of land.
Such a delivery of a deed to a third party to be later delivered by him to the grantee upon the latter's compliance with the
condition named, has given rise to some very interesting questions. One of the most interesting is who should bear the loss
when the depository wrongfully delivers the deed to the grantee
before the condition has been fulfilled? The determination of
this question depends upon when there is an effective delivery of
the deed, whether the deed becomes effective on the delivery by
the grantor to the depository or on the delivery by the depository
to the grantee or upon the performance of the condition by the
grantee.
It was early laid down in Shepard's Touchstone 2 that
"when the conditions are performed and the deed is delivered
over, the deed shall take as much effect as if delivered immediately to the party to whom the deed is made, and no act of God
or man, can hinder this effect, if the party that doth make it be
not at the time of making thereof disabled to make it."
The difficulty, however, with making the deed effective from
the second delivery of the performance of the condition was
that it did not work justice in cases where the, rights of third
parties, as creditors, for instance, intervened between the first
and second deliveries. To take care of such cases the doctrine
of relation back was resorted to. In speaking of this doctrine.
of relation back, we find the author of the Touchstone 3 saying:
"Where deeds have a kind of double delivery, as in case of a delivery as an escrow, there they shall take effect from, and have
relation to, the time of the first delivery, or not, ut res valeat:
for if the relation may hurt, and for some cause make void, (as
in some cases it may) there it shall not relate; but if the relation
1161 Ky. 401, 170 S. W. 891 (1914).
'Chap. 4, p. 59.
3P. 72.
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may help it, as in case a feme sole delivers a deed as an escrow,
and before the second delivery she is married or dieth, in this
case, if there were not a relation, the deed would be void and
therefore in this case it shall relate."
Also in Perryman's case 4 it was said, "If a man delivers a
writing as an escrow, and afterwards the obligor or obligee dies,
and afterwards the condition is performed, the deed is good,
for there was, traditio inchoate, in the life-time of the parties,
sed postea consummata existens by the performance of the condition, take its effect by force of the first d6livery."
Thus the law Was early established that a deed in escrow
took elect from the second delivery 5 but that in exceptional
cages under the doctrine of relating back the deed would be given
eflect from the time of the first delivery in order to do justice
in the particular case, or to carry out the intention of the parties. e
Since this doctrine of relation back is a fiction of law invoked to do justice, the question naturally arises as to whether
it should be invoked against an innocent purchaser. If the
courts in these cases of escrows have, with one or two exceptions,
been working out the legal rights of the parties in the same way
that equity courts would have worked them out as equitable
rights, as has been suggested by Professor Bigelow, 7 then the innocent'purchaser 'for value should be protected in all cases where
equity would protect him. Of coirse, the most common case
is where the depositary wrongfully delivers the deed to the grantee before the condition is performed and the grantee deeds the
land to an innocent purchaser for value. While the overwhelming weight of authority is that such an unauthorized delivery or
fraudulent procurement of delivery does not pass title so that
the bona, fide purchaser from the grantee should be protected,
there are a few courts that have said the maxim that where one
of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, the one who has put
it in the power of another to cause that loss, should bear that
loss, should apply; that the grantor, since he selected the depositary, should bear any loss that comes through the depositary's
default. In Blight v.Schenck s the Pennsylvania court took this
45 Coke, 84.

TCook's Adm'r v. Hendricks, 20 Ky. (4 T. B. Monroe) 500 (1827).
'Uraddock v. Barnes, 142 N. C. 89, 54 S. D. 1003 (1896).
Conditiqnal Deliveries of Deeds of Land, 26 Harv. L. R. 565, 575.
'10 Pa. St. 285, 57 Am. Dec., 478.
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bosition, saying that the agent had powe to deliver the deed and
if he delivered it contrary to his instructions, he was answerable
to his principal and it was therefore reasonable that the latter,
and not the innocent purchaser, should bear the loss.
Advocates of this view urge the analogy of the law of negotiable instruments and point out that the weight of authority is
to the effect that if a promissory note is deposited in escrow with
a third person and its delivery is procured by the payee from the
depositary without the maker's knowledge or consent and without the performance of the conditions" the innocent purchaser
from the payee may hold the maker ;9 and this is the rule under
the Negotiable Instruments Law.' 0 The Negotiable Instruments
Law, in fact, provides that the validity of the delivery in such
cases shall be conclusively presumed, and it is urged that there
is as much reason from the point of view of public policy for
protecting the bona-fide purchaser in one case as in the other.
While in the case of negotiable instruments there is the policy
of making bills and notes pass from hand t6"hand like money,
there is in the ca~e of conveyances of land the policy of making
public records of such coifveyances conclusive as to what appears
on such records. For these reasons those who would protect the
innocent purchaser from the grantee who has wrongfully procured a delivery of the deed from the depositary, would raise a
conclusive presumption of a valid delivery against the grantor
in favor of the bona fide purchaser or by law impose an agency
on the depositary to pass title in such- cases.
To the writer, such a result seems not to be in keeping with
the fundamental nature of a delivery in escrow. While the term
"escrow" originally meant a scrowl or writing and that the instrument on its first delivery was nothing more nor less than a
mere scrowl or writing, it was early pointed out that suc4 a delivery had a greater legal significance than the mere delivery of
a piece of paper." In 1591, the court of King's Bench in the
famous case of Butler and Baker' 2 said: "To some intent, the
second delivery hath relation to the 'first delivery, and to some
'Norton,
on Bills and Notes (4th Ed.), p. 99.
0

" Section 16 (3rd sentence).
"Blackstone's Commentaries, Book II, p. 307.
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not, and yet in truth, the second delivery hath all its force by
the first delivery; and the second is but an execution and consummation of the first; ...
"
Since the second delivery has all its force by the first, it has
been suggested that the first delivery really leaves a fee in the
grantor subject to be defeated by the grantee's performing the
condition named therein or the happening of the event specified.
This suggestion as to the real nature of a deed in escrow has received some recognition by judges and legal writers in recent
years. It was pointed out by Judge Walker of the North Carolina court in the case of Craddock v. Barnes;13 by a note writer
of the Harvard Law Review in 1904;14 and by Professor Ballantine in a very learned article on the nature of escrows published in the Illinois Law Bulletin. 15
To quote from the opinion in the North Carolina case:
"Some courts hold that an escrow does not take effect as a fully
executed deed until there has been a rightful delivery to the
grantee; but the logical position approved in a number of authorities is that it is effective as a deed when the grantor relinquishes
the possession and control of it by delivery to the depositary,
and it passes the title to.the grantee when the condition is fully
performed, without the necessity of a second delivery by the depositary, and it may by a fiction of the law, have relation back
to the date of its original execution, or deposit, when necessary
for the purpose of doing justice or of effectuating the intention
of the parties." 16
The Harvard note writer, after considering some jurisdictions that allow the innocent purchaser for value from the grantor to prevail over'the grantee of the escrow on the ground that
the doctrine of relation is a fiction invoked to do justice and
therefore should not apply against such a bona fide purchaser,
says: "Other jurisdictions do not allow an innocent purchaser
to defeat the grantee in escrow. These jurisdictions hold that
"142 N. C.89, 54 S. E. 1003 (1906).
118 Harvard L. Rev. 138.
"3 Illinois L. Bulletin, 1, 12. (1920).
"The court in its last sentence of the passage quoted Is stating the
general doctrine of relation back. This seems inconsistent witlb the
position that the instrument is a deed forthwith on the delivery to the
depositary. If the deed is effective on the first delivery when the
grantor puts it out of his control, it Is useless to talk about relation
back.
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after the deed is placed in escrow the grantor no longer has full
legal title. The grant in escrow puts the land out of his power
and makes it possible for the grantee to get something analogous to specific performance at law. All that the grantor has is a
title subject to a defeasance, and a title subject to a defeasance
is all that a purchaser from him, whether mala fide or bona fid.,
can buy.
Professor Ballantine expresses the idea in a clearer and,
perhaps, more forceful way. He says: "While it is true that deposit in escrow does not divest the grantor of his 'title' it does
create a change in the legal relations between the grantor and
the grantee with reference to the land. If B does nothing, title
remains in A. If B performs the condition, title passes to him.
Where the condition is a future voluntary act of the grantee, the
deed creates an irrevocable power in the grantee to draw the
title out of the grantor. Where the condition is any other event,
the deed creates an irrevocable conditional interest in the grantee. An escrow prior to the performance of the condition is
therefore not a mere paper like a will before the death of the
testator. It changes legal relations. It is not a mere draft of a
deed or an executory contract to convey, but is a deed presently
with a definite legal operation. Every act necessary to a complete operative deed must be done by the grantor, who delivers
the escrow deed to a third person subject only to a condition precedent suspending transfer of the complete and unconditional
property interest. A conditional delivery is as final and binding
an expression of intent as an absolute delivery."17
The position taken by these authorities seems to the writer
to be sound. The instrument when delivered to the depositary
in escrow is an effective deed forthwith and creates and changes
legal interests in the land. The grantor who before the delivery
had a fee simple estate in the land, after delivery, has a defeasible fee simple or holds his estate, as Professor Ballantine points
out, subject to an executory limitation.1 8 It is beyond the grantor's power to prevent his estate from divesting upon the happening of the event or fulfillment of the condition that is to
create an estate in the grantee. An irrevocable power is created
in the grantee as suggested in the passage quoted above, whereby
"Illinois Law Bulletin 1, 10.

"Ibid., p. 13.

36 -
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he can take the title out of the grantor and put it into himself.
The New York court early referred to. the grantee's interest as
"a quasi-creation of an estate subject to be defeated by the failure to perform the stipulated condition.'" 19
The 4iew that the first delivery of a deed in escrqw is effective and leaves a defeasible fee in the grantor, seems to be
more in accord with the results reached in the greater number of
cases and to harmonize the decisions mudch better than any other
theory that has been suggested. The instances noted by the
King's Bench in the early case of Butler and Baker 20 as exceptions are consistent with it. Where the grantor is a ifeme sole
at the time of the first delivery, her marriage before the time
of the second delivery does not affect the rights of the grantee,
or if the grantor dies before the second delivery the grantee's
right is not thereby cut off. -Also consider the converse of these
cases, where the grantor was under disability, such as infancy,
insanity or coverture, at the time of the first delivery, but becomes of age, or sane or discovert before the time of the second
delivery. In none of these cases will 'a delivery after -the disability is removed make the deed effective. It was inoperative
at the time of the first delivery and therefore did not create a
defeasible fee in the grantee, and consequently a performance of
the act called for on the part of the grantee would not cut short
the grantor's fee.
The grantor remains liable for the taxes until his estate is
terminated by the performance of the condition as in the case of
any other estate subject to an executory limitation. 21 The grantor, on the other hand, is entitled to the rents and profits until'
the condition is performed 2 but where the parties have stipulated thati the grantee shall pay interest from the date of the
23
contract, he is entitled to the rents and profits from that date.
Let us consider also'the case of the purchaser from the
grantor after he has deposited a deed of the same land in escrow.
Just as in the case of a conveyance by a vendor who has made a
binding contract for the sale of land the transferee takes subHunter v. .Eunter,' 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 25.
"1

Coke 25a, 35b.

'21ohr v. Joslin, 162 Ia. 34, 142 N. W. 981; McMurtrey v. Bridges,
1
41 Okla. 264, 137 Pac. 721.
2Tiffany, Real Property (2nd Ed.) (1781.)
3'9cott v. Solan, 72 Kan. 545, 84 Pac. 117.
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ject to the rights of the grantee of the escrow deed provided
he takes with notice. He gets no more than his transferor has,
a defeasible estate. 2 ' That the bona fide purchaser for :value
should be protected is consistent with our registration laws and,
therefore, not inconsistent with the view of the nature of an
escrow suggested by the authorities quoted. The position of the
creditor of the grantor who attaches the land conveyed in the
escrow deed is no better than that of the purchaser with notice as
was held in the case of Hall y. Harris.25 In a few jurisdictions
such an attaching creditor is regarded as a bona file purchaser -for
value and is given priority over the grantee of the escrow deed.20
The position of the heir, the donee, and the devisee of the grantor is like that of the purchaser with notice.2 7 Since the grantor
has a defeasible fee only, his heir, his donee, or Vs devisee
should take no'geater estate.
Not an uncommon case to arise where there is A delivery to
a third party to hold until the happening of some event, is where
the delivery is conditioned upon the 'grantor's own death. A
few courts have solved the difficulty in this case by holding that
such instruments are testamentary and ineffective unless they
conform to the requirements of the law as to wills, 28 but -thegreat
majority of courts hold such deeds valid. Some have regarded
the deed as immediately vesting the fee in the grantee subject
to a life estate in the grantor.29 Others support the conveyance
as creating an estate in futuro in the grantee with a resulting
fee in the grantor, subject to a limitation in the grantee named
conditioned upon the death of the grantor. 30 Those courts that
sustain such deeds without distinguishing them from the cases,
where the vesting of the estate in the grantee depends upon some
act of the grantee himself, lay stress upon the doctrine of relating back to the first delivery. The decisions that uphold these
deeds that are to take effect upon the death of the grantor are
undoubtedly correct but the ground for their correctness, it is
2Vlkins v. Somerville, 80 Vt. 48, 66 AtI. 893; Tiffany Real Prop.
(2nd Ed.) (1780).
05 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 303, (1848).
2"Tiffany, Real Property (2nd Ed.), p. 1780.
2Cook's Adm'r v. Hendricks, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 500; Lindley v.
Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26.
"Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. St. 126.
"Kirby v. Hulette, 174 Ky. 257, 192 S. W. 63.
"Note and cases cited, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 508.
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submitted, is that the deed is operative when executed and
creates a future limitation. The courts that rest their decision
in such cases upon the creation of a present fee in the grantee
subject to a life estate in the grantor are at least changing the
language of the instrument.
When we consider the effect of a delivery of a deed in escrow
from the point of view of the grantee, we find that upon the performance of the condition title vests in the grantee without the
depositary's handing over the deed,3 1 and the grantee is then
entitled to the possession of the deed as evidence of his title and
may proceed against the depositary at law upon his refusal to
give it up. 32 This, too, is consistent with the idea that first delivery creates a defeasible estate in the grantor.
Turning now to the question in regard to the effect of a deed
in escrow in which we are more especially interested, that is
where there is a wrongful delivery by the depositary we find
that the view taken as to the nature of a delivery in escrow is
consistent with the holding of the majority of courts on this
point. The weight of authoritiy follows the rule laid down in
the leading case of Smith v. South Royalton Bank33 that the innocent purchaser from the grantee is not protected. Since the
title of the grantor cannot be divested except by the fulfillment
of the condition, it follows that the depositary by a wrongful
delivery of the deed cannot pass title to the grantee and thus
enable the latter to pass it on to the innocent purchaser any
more than he can, by refusing to hand over the instrument, keep
title from vesting in the grantee of the escrow upon the latter's
fulfilling the condition named.
Manv of the cases holding the opposite view, that the innocent purchaser in such cases should be protected, rest upon estoppel, as in Schurtz v. Colvi?, 3 4 the leading case of the minority view. Here the grantor had not only selected a depositary
who wrongfully turned over the deed to the grantee without the
performance of the act called for but had placed the grantee in
possession of the land. Such a case is quite analogous to that
of a vendee of a chattel who leaves the chattel in the possession
•'lYradlock v. Barnes, 142 N. C. 87, 54 S. E. 1003; Couch v. Meeker.
2 Conn. 'M2, 7 Am. Dec., 274.
-',-o,,rivestment Co. v. Na4'l Bank, 47 Wash. 566, 92 Pac, 380.
'32 Vt. 341.
'55 Ohio St. 274.
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of the vendor and the latter wrongfully sells it to an innocent
purchaser for value. Many courts have held such retention of
possession by the vendor to be fraudulent as to bona fide purchasers from the vendor. 35 Then, in the case of the grantee's
being let into possession and the depositary's wrongful delivery
of the deed, an exception might be made and the innocent purchaser be protected. The court, however, in Schurtz v. Colvin,
said that in such a case the grantor was estopped to deny the delivery. Many other cases cited in support of allowing the inno36
cent purchaser's claim to prevail, like Blight v. Schenck,
really turn on some other point. In that case, the statement of
the court in favor of holding the bona fide purchaser's right superior to the grantor's was a mere dictum as the grantor had
failed to prove that there had been no valid delivery. Other
cases that are often cited in support of the innocent purchaser's
claim arc Quick v. Mulligan,37 Cotton v. Gregory,3 8 and Mays v.
7hbieldS, 39 and in each case the grantee had been let into possession or the grantor had already recognized the grantee's possession of the instrument as valid for some purposes.
As already pointed out, if the courts in applying the Ioetrine of relation back are trying to work out the rights of the
parties as equity courts would work them out they should in
the case of an innocent purchaser from the grantee who has
wrongfully secured the deed from the depositary, protect the innocent purchaser for value rather than the grantor. From the
point of view of justice, it would seem that the innocent purchaser's case was a strong one for applying the doctrine of relation back for his protection. We have seen, however, that with
few exceptions the courts have not done this. They have rightly
held that no title passed by the wrongful delivery. They have
acted at least upon the theory that performance of the condition
upon the part of the grantee or the happening of the event specified was necessary to take title out of the grantor. In practice,
at least, they have really recognized the fact that the grantor
had a defeasible fee which could not be cut short by the depositary's delivery of the deed to the grantee. It is submitted then
"Uniform Sales Act, Section 25.
"Note 9, supra.
37108 Ind. 419, 9 N. E. 392.
310 Neb. 126, 4 N. W. 939
1117 Ga. 814, 45 S. E. 68.
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that it Would clarify the law as to delivery of a deed in escrow
if ourts would cease talking, about the doctrine of relation bck
and recognize the real naturp of adelivery in escrow, that the
deed is Qperative as a deed from the first delivery and leves in
the grantor a fee which is subject to be idefeat~d by the grantee's performing the act specified and in no other way.
W.
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